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Richelle Finn 
 
 
 
 
In Philip K. Dick’s masterpiece 1968 science fiction novel Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep?, World War Terminus has devastated the population of Earth and 
left the planet almost uninhabitable, compelling survivors to flee to Mars or one 
of several colony planets. The emigrants are given free android servants as an 
incentive to serve them in space. The androids are highly intelligent, 
sophisticated, and efficient; so much so that they are nearly indistinguishable from 
human beings. Occasionally, an android slave kills their master and flees Mars for 
safe haven on Earth. Thus, bounty hunters are employed by police agencies to 
protect the small but resolute communities of humans who reject emigration and 
those who cannot emigrate because the harmful, unsafe effects of living on the 
post-apocalyptic Earth. The main character of the novel is one of these bounty 
hunters named Rick Deckard.  Throughout the course of the novel as he destroys 
or “retires” six of the aforementioned escaped androids, Deckard's sense of 
identity is shaken; he begins to question if he might be an android too and not a 
human like he is led to believe, due to his ever increasingly cold, distant nature. 
 Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? explores the ethical implications 
of enslaving the androids and, more importantly, androids are used as a tool to 
analyze and identify the true essence of humanity. Humans claim that the 
androids do not possess empathy; therefore, humanity's essence must be in their 
sense of empathy, or so their logic dictates. In the novel, a polygraph-like device 
called the Voight-Kampff Machine is used to determine if a subject shows signs 
of empathy in order to determine if the individual is an android or a human; yet 
the question remains, should empathy really be the defining quality of 
determining humanity? 
 With this in mind, I will examine Philip K. Dick's Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep? using psychoanalytic criticism, specifically French psychoanalyst 
Jacques Lacan's mirror stage theory. In Lacan's article entitled "The mirror stage 
as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience,” 
Lacan describes the mirror stage of a child's development as, "the transformation 
that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image -whose predestination to 
this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the 
ancient term imago," (Lacan 503). Additionally, according to the definition of the 
theory provided by the University of Hawaii's English Department in their article 
"Lacan: The Mirror Stage,” "...human infants pass through a stage in which an 
external image of the body (reflected in a mirror, or represented to the infant 
through the mother or primary caregiver) produces a psychic response that gives 
rise to the mental representation of an 'I'.” To clarify, Lacan refers to a milestone 
in an infant's psychological development in which that when the baby looks in a 
mirror, they come to the realization that the image they are seeing is not just any 
ordinary image, it is actually themselves in the mirror. This "a-ha" moment of 
self-realization is what Lacan's Mirror Stage Theory is based on, and he develops 
an immensely complex set of hypotheses stemming from this very real moment in 
every human's life. 
Lacan's ideas that arose from his studies of the mirror stage are fascinating 
to say the least, though at times it can be quite challenging to comprehend. As 
Lacan explains,  
 
This... specular image by the child at the infans stage... would seem to 
exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is 
precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of 
identification with the other, and before language restores to it... as 
subject. This form would have to be called the Ideal-I… This form situates 
the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional 
direction, which will always remain irreducible for the individual alone, or 
rather, which will only rejoin the coming-into-being...of the subject 
asymptotically, whatever the success of the dialectical syntheses by which 
he must resolve as I his discordance  with his own reality (Lacan 503) 
 
Furthermore, in the University of Hawaii's article "Lacan: The Mirror Stage,”  
 
The infant identifies with the image, which serves as a gestalt of the 
infant's emerging perceptions of selfhood, but because the image of a 
unified body does not correspond with the underdeveloped infant's 
physical vulnerability and weakness, this imago is established as an Ideal-I 
toward which the subject will perpetually strive throughout his or her life. 
The mirror stage establishes the ego as fundamentally dependent upon 
external objects, on an other. ...this "other" will be elaborated within social 
and linguistic frameworks that will give each subject's personality  its 
particular characteristics ("Lacan: The Mirror Stage"). 
 
What this means is that when an individual comes to the realization that the image 
in the mirror is of themselves, they further realize that it must be how others will 
perceive of them to be. This can be a problem, as the image that one sees does not 
necessarily align with how they perceive themselves in their mind's eye. A person 
will then continuously strive throughout their life to bring that ideal self, or the 
Ideal-I, into fruition. The image in the mirror becomes this "Other", through 
which an individual will always scrutinize and pass judgment on, for it is not their 
ideal selves. 
 Using these same principles outlined above, I hypothesize that in Philip K. 
Dick's novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, the androids are the humans' 
artificial and technological Other. The androids thus perform the function of the 
mirror image of oneself, but they do so on a societal, not an individual, scale. The 
humans' anxieties about the androids focuses on the uncertainty of what being a 
human entails. As Philip K. Dick himself stated,  
 
  
 The purpose of this story as I saw it was that in his job of hunting  and 
killing these [androids], Deckard becomes progressively dehumanized. At 
the same time, the [androids] are being perceived as becoming more 
human. Finally, Deckard must question what he is doing, and really what 
is the essential difference between him and them? And, to take it one step 
further, who is he if there is no real difference? (Grace "Literary Contexts 
in Novels: Philip K. Dick's "Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?"). 
 
Hence, I believe that Dick uses the conflict of determining the biological from the 
artificial to illustrate Lacan's psychoanalytic theory of the mirror stage and to 
showcase the importance in mankind's continual search for determining what 
humanity is and who we really are.  
 In order to help confirm my hypothesis, some research questions I sought 
to answer are as follows: What does the idea of humans wanting to own biological 
animals as pets instead of artificial ones tell us about the mindset of the characters 
in the novel? How does it represent the dichotomy of humans versus androids; the 
notion that androids are not real people? What does the artificial toad at the end of 
the novel symbolize about Deckard and his sense of identity and humanity? Is the 
Voight-Kampff Machine intrinsically flawed? Why is Rick Deckard's sense of 
identity is shaken due to his interactions with the androids? Are humans really 
any different than androids? Lastly, how is this all related to Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, specifically Lacan's Mirror Stage Theory? 
 In Klaus Benesch's article "Technology, Art, and the Cybernetic Body: 
The Cyborg as Cultural Other in Fritz Lang's 'Metropolis' and Philip K. Dick's 'Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?'", the role of cyborgs/androids are examined 
in the works of Fritz Lang's Metropolis and Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? according to Lacanian theory; specifically he uses the Mirror Stage theory 
to highlight how Philip K. Dick shows the main conflict of differentiating 
humanity from androids using the Voight-Kampff machine as being 
fundamentally flawed. Essentially, the notion that androids do not possess 
empathy therefore humans must possess this trait is proven false as Deckard 
interacts with the androids more and more. 
 First, Benesch addresses the fact that the androids look identical to 
humans in every way, physically speaking. "As with the androgynous 
characters,... we can neither be wholly assured of the visual markers of the human 
nor of those which define the identity of the cyborg. On the contrary, the very 
essence of the imagery of the man-machine turns on the fact that it resembles as 
much as it estranges the organic body" (Benesch 389-390). This makes the use of 
the psychological test and the Voight-Kampff machine crucial in determining a 
human from an android. The androids look identical to humans; this makes the 
androids, as in the Lacanian theory, an Other. In this case, they are the artificial, 
machinal or technological Other. "Similar to Lacan's heterodoxical concept of 
identification," Benesch explains, 
 
  the machinal Other of this story appears to be but a doubling and 
 distorted image of the spectator, a direct product and brainchild of the 
 humans' mind. Moreover, Deckard's attempt to stalk and finally detect the 
 technological Other through a combination of projections and "gazing" 
 refers to the Lacanian emphasis on the gaze as marker of the child's 
 fascination with his/her own mirror image (390). 
 
This means that Deckard slowly realizes that the androids are not just some 
technological Other that humanity has created for itself to use as we please, but 
that the androids are actually a reflection on humanity itself. Humanity can be just 
as emotionless, cold, and logical as the androids, which makes sense as humans 
created the androids in their own image. 
 As the main character Rick Deckard hunts down and "retires" the six 
fugitive androids one by one, he slowly begins to question his own humanity. He 
sees that the androids are not so different from humans at all, as one of the 
androids is even an opera singer, for example. Yet, the fault of not being able to 
truly differentiate between a human and an android does not lie within Deckard, 
but within the parameters of the Voight-Kampff test.  
As Benesch suggests,  
 
the test is devised according to a preset notion of what it means to be a 
machine, that is, the lack of emotional responses, it is doomed to replicate 
endlessly the false premises of the human observer.... the whole design 
rests on an inherent paradox: by presupposing the disinterestedness and 
emotional aloofness of the experimenter, the Voight-Kampff scale  betrays 
the same psychological markers as the non-person it seeks to identify. 
  
The difference, then, between artificial and "natural" existence  does  
not originate within the machine; rather it results from the  paradoxical  
desire rampant in technologically advanced cultures to define 
 humanity against the technological as Other and alien to human nature. It 
 is thus... always the humans, and not the androids, who dream of electric 
 sheep (390). 
 
It is through the Lacanian mirror stage theory that Benesch determines that the 
test itself is irrefutably flawed. 
 In Irina-Ana Drobot's article "Flower-Power Tantra By Claudia Golea 
And Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? By Philip K. Dick: Creating A 
Different Reality,” Flower-Power Tantra and Do Androids Dream are compared 
and contrasted by the ways in which the texts help break our sense of what reality 
is and how the respective stories are told through these alternate realities. 
Specifically, Drobot delves into the nature of humans' relationship with the 
androids, and tells us how the androids are being treated as slaves and not as 
sentient beings with the ability to write their own destinies. This goes a little into 
critical race theory, as Drobot compares the humans' treatment of the androids to 
"the problem of minorities. At some point, one android notices that even the 
animals have become protected by the law, that they have become sacred, while 
the androids are withdrawn, a word created to express their killing" (Drobot 43). 
Humans have now divided beings into a new binary: the biological and the 
artificial. It is the fact that the androids are an artificial life form and not 
biological that makes humans value animals over androids. This further 
demonstrates how the humans represent Lacan's ideal I while the androids are the 
technological Other that humans must scrutinize and pass judgment on.  
 Drobot has also recognized the main quality that humans use to justify the 
hunting down and killing the androids in the novel, and that is the supposed lack 
of empathy in the androids. This idea the humans hold that empathy is an inherent 
quality of humanity is called into question: "people are distinguished by their 
ability to feel empathy. But is this really true? The novel seems to question this 
idea at some point. The hero, the bounty hunter, is determined to wonder at some 
point whether he himself is not an android. How come that he can kill androids in 
cold blood? Did he do that psychological test himself?" (Drobot 43). Deckard's 
own humanity is addressed by Drobot as she describes how, "The memories of 
the bounty hunter could be false memories, i.e. the memories of another, referring 
to psychology, Freudian psychoanalysis and all sorts of experiments, as is the case 
in the novel, with a generation of androids inside whose minds memories of 
human beings were introduced" (Drobot 43). This is evidence of the uncertainty 
of what qualifies as a measure of humanity that is presented in the novel. Drobot 
further addresses that a psychological test for empathy is flawed, and concludes 
that Dick could be addressing the problems in the field of psychology. As she 
explains, "Psychological tests sometimes prove inadequate for the recognition of 
androids. It could be some judgment directed towards the accuracy of 
psychological tests given at work or in other situations, or of psychology in 
general, an often controversial science" (Drobot 43). This conclusion supports my 
theory that having empathy as the one factor for determining humanity is a big 
problem and is unfounded. Therefore, the Voight-Kampff machine and the 
psychological tests themselves are incorrect. 
 Jill Galvan's article "Entering the Posthuman Collective in Philip K. Dick's 
'Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?'" addresses many different aspects of 
posthumanism within the novel, including the evolution of humanity, the blending 
of nature with technology, and the search for the self within in the twenty-first 
century. The use of empathy as the quintessential human quality is called into 
question, and Galvan analyses this according to different aspects of psychology 
and philosophy. Galvan first tells us of how futile it is to really differentiate 
humans from androids, since both are alike in many ways. Humans can be cold, 
heartless, and prone to violence at times, and these qualities can be just as 
intrinsic to a human's life as it is to an android. She explains that,  
 
The electronic image brings this question to the fore, and further it  reveals 
the firm boundaries of the human collective as wholly fictional. Dick's 
human characters naively pride themselves on their empathic unity and 
derogate technological constructs as inherently secondary to biological 
ones... Yet as we have seen, machines have not only infiltrated the human 
collective, but have also become an integral part of the establishment—an 
ineradicable element of human day-to-day existence (Galvan 418). 
 
Many scholars believe that life in the twenty-first century will be one of Post-
humanism, and the biological will be integrated with the technological, and Dick's 
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? demonstrates just how much that is a true 
statement. 
 Though not only are humans more like androids in their lack of empathy 
at times and the use of technology in their everyday lives, but the reverse is also 
shown to be true; androids can be just as empathic as humans. Galvan tells us 
that, "... a few of the androids Rick deals with exhibit what appears to be caring 
for their own kind and even, in some cases, for the humans with whom they 
interact." (414). She describes one scene where the android Rachael kills 
Deckard's pet goat in a fit of supposed jealousy, or that is what it appears to be: 
 
[Deckard] returns home to discover that Rachael has pushed [his]  goat 
off the roof Why? Because she is jealous of his love for the goat, or in 
revenge for his killing her friends...? Whichever interpretation one 
chooses, the action is not consistent with the official picture of android 
psychology, which like Dick's essays insists that androids are incapable of 
feeling loyalty or indeed feeling anything at all (Galvan 415). 
 
Galvan proclaims that if the Voight-Kampff machine could analyze the android’s 
actions in those instances, then, "...the scenarios that Rick proffers to his android 
suspects would not, should they generate an apathetic response, differentiate 
androids from modern Americans" (415). Not only do the humans act like 
androids, but the androids also act like humans. So, are humans and androids so 
different?  
Galvan concludes that mankind trying to distinguish humans from androids is a 
futile effort. The androids do have empathy and resemble human fallacies 
regardless of what the humans might want to believe.  
 Sherryl Vint takes a different approach to analyzing the novel in her article 
"Speciesism and species being in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?" and 
explores the role of biological and artificial animals within the larger context. It is 
her belief that literary critics have thoroughly analyzed the role of the androids 
and have ignored the importance of animals in the text. Vint's intent of the article 
is “to focus attention on an aspect of the original text neglected in both the film 
adaptation and by [literary] criticism: the importance of animals, [both artificial 
ones] and real. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? develops its ideas about 
being human through two comparisons: animals and androids" (111). She uses 
some psychoanalysis in the article though the main theoretical framework used is 
Marxism; specifically, the novel is analyzed according to Marx's species being 
theory.  
 In her article, Vint is not shy about her disappointment in the lack of 
analysis on the role that animals play in the novel within the literary critic 
community. She believes that, 
  only by realizing the centrality of animals can we perceive all the 
 implications of Deckard's change. It is not... that Deckard risks becoming 
 increasingly like the androids through his work as a bounty hunter; rather, 
 the risk faced by Deckard and other humans in the novel lies in realizing 
 that they already are android-like, so long as they define their subjectivity 
 based on the logical, rational, calculating part of human being (Vint 112).  
 
Vint also addresses the importance of the final scene of the novel, as she describes 
the way 
 
the novel's final scene, Iran orders electric flies for the electric  toad, a 
sign of love for her husband who is "devoted to it" beyond reason,  beyond 
rationality, beyond reciprocity.... In this act of care for the electric  toad 
(even though it has no economic status as it is not 'real') Iran and Deckard 
begin to find a way out of commodity fetishism. They are  learning to 
treat the toad with kindness rather than as a possession because  it is the 
social relationship--not the ontological status of the toad--that counts 
(121). 
 
For Vint, the final scene completes Deckard's story arc of realizing that humans 
and androids, the biological and the artificial, are not so different; how of little 
importance it is to try and make one superior to the other. 
  Vint also addresses the failure of the Voight-Kampff Test and how an 
android can reasonably answer the questions in a manner consistent with human 
thought and logic but deem them not human because it does not elicit an empathic 
response. For example,  
 
During her empathy test, when told about a banquet at which dog  was 
served, Luba responds, 'Nobody would kill and eat a dog… They're worth 
a fortune' (103), a non-empathic response that marks her as an android, but 
which is nonetheless consistent with attitudes toward animals displayed by 
the human characters... it is worth noting that most of Dick's audience 
would fail the Voight-Kampff test. Its questions--about topics such as 
boiling live lobster, eating meat, or using fur--denote things that are 
commonplace rather than shocking in our world (Vint 114). 
 
Vint's analysis of the role of animals in the novel, the cold logic demonstrated by 
humans, and the instances of empathy shown by the androids all are important 
pieces of evidence that help support my hypothesis. With this in mind, it is only 
fair to determine that the empathy test is highly illogical and inconsistent with 
human nature. 
 It is interesting to note that Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theories and 
Philip K. Dick's fictional works are both considered to be within the 
Postmodernism Movement. Furthermore, in January 1966, "With the publication 
of Ecrits, a collection of [Lacan's] writings which includes the essay on the Mirror 
Stage, Jacques Lacan gains a wider audience among intellectuals," (Felluga 
"Lacan II: On the Structure of the Psyche"). Though his essay on the Mirror Stage 
was originally published in 1949, readers did not really take notice of it until the 
publication of Ecrits in 1966. Shortly thereafter, in 1968, the first edition of Philip 
K. Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? was published. It could be 
merely coincidence, but it is curious that there are so many parallels found in 
Lacan's and Dick's works and so many examples of Lacan's Mirror Stage Theory 
found in Dick's novel that one has to wonder if Dick actually had the theory in 
mind when Dick wrote it, even if only in his subconscious. 
 Whether or not Dick had Lacan's Mirror Stage Theory in mind, 
consciously or subconsciously, while writing his novel or not, one cannot dispute 
that there does seem to be a connection between these two works of Posthumanist 
thought. I believe that this essay is only scratching the surface of what 
philosophical, psychoanalytical, and Posthumanist insights one can find in Do 
Androids Dream. Dick's beloved science fiction classic novel's importance is still 
vital in our continual search for answering questions of identity; what being 
human really is, if empathy really is a defining characteristic of humanity, and the 
role technology has on us as a society and as individuals in the future. 
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